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This paper illustrates how the use of microeconometric techniques can be used to 
uncover the micro dynamics behind macro shocks. Using Mexican micro data we find 
out that—controlling for everything else—between 1994 and 1998 returns to personal 
characteristics in the tradable sector increased particularly those of skilled labourers. By 
the year 2000 the positive shock upon the tradeable sector vanishes with returns to 
personal characteristics converging to the levels observed in the non-tradable sector. We 
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the negative shock of the peso crises in the absence of trade liberalization (NAFTA) and 
find out that under such a scenario the poverty headcount ratio would have increased 
more than 2 percentage points above the one observed in 1996. The simulated second-
order effect of these changes shows that the skill mixed changed in a way that favoured 
relatively skilled men and relatively unskilled women. These changes in labour 
participation and occupation had an overall positive income effect though adverse in 
distributive terms. 
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The welfare e®ects of market oriented reforms in developing countries re-
mains a highly polemical topic. Although market liberalizing reforms include
a wide range of economic policies, the great bulk of studies on the subject
have concentrated on the welfare e®ects brought about by trade policy. This
is not surprising given the advantage of having a well-established theoreti-
cal framework linking trade policy with household welfare.1 Moreover most
of the market-oriented reforms have trade liberalization at the core of their
economic policy. The most in°uential empirical papers linking trade and
welfare have concentrated on the impact that trade liberalization had upon
wage di®erentials (skilled vs. unskilled labourers) during the 1980s and early
1990s (see Revenga 1995; Feenstra and Hanson 1997; Harrison and Hanson
1999). The main result found by those studies is that wage di®erentials were
positively related with trade reforms, explained, possibly, by the world wide
skill biased technological change taking place during that time. Although
wages are an important part of household welfare, the approach undertaken
in the afore mentioned papers, fails to take other important income compo-
nents into account. More importantly, the e®ects of a particular policy (e.g.
reduction of trade tari®s) are di±cult, if not impossible, to identify under
the before-and-after approach used by the wage di®erentials literature.
The present study contributes to the ongoing trade-welfare debate by im-
plementing a novel microeconometric technique using Mexican household
survey data for years 1994 to 2000. Through out this period, Mexico under-
took important market liberalizing reforms. The combination of the 1994-95
peso crises and the enactment of the North American Free Trade Agree-
ment (NAFTA) transformed the economy into one in which the main source
of growth were exports of manufacturing products. This sectoral redistrib-
ution favouring the manufacturing exporting ¯rms had a profound impact
1For discussion on the subject see Dixit (1980) and more recently, McCulloch, Winters
and Cirera (2002).
1upon household incomes via the changes taking place in the labour mar-
ket. To understand the ex post welfare e®ects of Mexico's turn towards a
manufacturing-intensive economy is not only useful for future Mexican trade
policy design, but it can also be the starting point for ex ante trade policy
evaluation in other Latin American countries.
We develop a model that is able to identify all household income components
(variables, parameters and unobservables).2 In order to disentangle the im-
pact that the policy under evaluation has upon a particular household, we
estimate the underlying structural parameters determining household in-
comes. The model accounts for earnings and incomes from self-employment
activities in Mexican urban areas. The agent's behaviour is taken into ac-
count by modelling structural labour supply equations linking expected
wages and participation in an explicit way. Following this approach we can
identify the household income components that had a signi¯cant change after
the sectoral redistribution took place and their impact upon household and
overall welfare. Moreover, the model allows us to undertake counterfactual
experiments of nature what would the distribution have look like had the pol-
icy under evaluation been the only change taking place between time t and t0?
To answer this question we microsimulate household incomes imposing the
counterfactual to be analyzed.
The paper contributes to the ongoing debate in two areas: (1) By creating
an explicit link between expected wages and labour participation, we are
able to quantify the second-order e®ects of changes in personal remunera-
tions brought about by the policy under evaluation. (2) Separating markets
between tradable (manufacturing) and non-tradable sectors we create hypo-
thetical income densities capturing the ceteris paribus e®ects of changes tak-
ing place in the market for tradable produce. We ¯nd out that|controlling
for everything else|between 1994 and 1998 returns to personal character-
istics in the tradable sector increased with highly skilled workers bene¯ting
2Our model is based on Bourguignon, Fournier and Gurgand (2001).
2relatively more than their unskilled counterpart. However by the year 2000
the positive shock upon the tradeable sector vanishes with returns to per-
sonal characteristics converging to the levels observed in the non-tradable
sector. We use our model's results to simulate a scenario where the Mexican
economy experienced the negative shock of the peso crises in the absence of
trade liberalization (NAFTA) and ¯nd out that the headcount poverty ratio
would have increased more than 2 percentage points above the observed one
in 1996. Inequality, on the contrary, would have been 4 Gini points higher
under such a hypothetical scenario. We simulate the change in participation
and occupation brought about by the sector redistribution (second-order ef-
fects). We ¯nd out that, in the case of men, the amount of skilled labourers
increase, whereas in the case of women the new entrants were relatively un-
skilled. This changes in participation and occupation had an overall positive
though disequalizing income e®ect.
This paper is organized in the following way. In the next section we develop
the income-generating model used to parameterize household incomes. In
that same section the microsimulation principles are described. In Section
3 we show some macroeconomic trends for Mexico during the period 1994-
2000 followed by the estimation results in Section 4. The microsimulation
analysis to evaluate the welfare impact of the estimated changes is undertaken
in Section 5. Finally conclusions can be found in the last section.
2 Parameterizing the density function
A simple way of analyzing the welfare changes occurring between two periods
is by plotting a density function of the log of household incomes as in Figure
1. Such a function will incorporate both the average income of the economy
and its distribution. In turn, all income distribution functions satisfying
some desired properties derive from a more general social welfare function
(Jenkins 1991.) For example, a utilitarian social welfare function is the sum
3of all household welfare. Assuming a decreasing marginal utility of income,
we can show that social welfare can be summarized by average real income
and its distribution (Sen 1974). In Figure 1 we use the log of real monthly
household per capita incomes for Mexico to plot a non-parametric kernel
density function for years 1994 and 1996.3 The kernel distribution contains
all the information needed to compute inequality indexes (determined by the
shape of the density function) and poverty measures (a function of both the
level and shape of the density). Therefore a change in absolute poverty4 will
be the outcome of shifts in the density (growth e®ect), changes in the shape
of it (distribution e®ect) and a residual (see Datt and Ravallion 1992).
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Our aim is to ¯nd out the underlying structural parameters determining
real incomes in each and every household in our sample. Once we have
done this we can reproduce the shape and level of the density function using
the estimated parameters, observable sociodemographic characteristics and
unobservable components. Formally, take the shape of the income density
3We are implicitly assuming no intra-household economies of scale and no di®erences
between children's and adults' cost.
4Using the standard FGT indexes often found in the literature.
4(distribution),5 and de¯ne an inequality index, I, as a function of a vector of
household incomes Y at time t:
It = I(Y t); Y t = (Y1t;:::;YHt) (1)
The parameters of index I(¢) will depend on the social welfare function used,
however the underlying parameters (i.e. those determining Y t) will depend
on structural relationships determined by economic theory. Under certain
assumptions, these structural parameters can be estimated empirically. In-
come of urban household h, Yh, will be the sum of earnings, income derived
from self employment activities and some exogenous income yo
ht. Therefore











Where wih and yih are the hourly wage and self-employment income of mem-
ber i in household h respectively; Lih and Lse
ih are labour supply functions in
the earnings and self-employed sectors respectively. The labour supply func-
tions account for both the discrete (participation) and continuous (hours of
work) dimensions of it.
The elements present in (2) can be decomposed into di®erent population seg-
ments, for example: wages for men vs. women, tradable vs. non-tradable
sector, etc. The segmentation use should obey some prior country-speci¯c
labour market information and also the nature of the particular policy under
evaluation. In our case, our objective is to perform a ¯rst approximation of
the e®ects that trade liberalizing reforms had upon each of the elements de¯n-
ing (2). Therefore it seems natural to separate the economy into tradable and
non-tradable sectors. The former includes the manufacturing sector whilst
5It will become apparent that ¯nding out the household income parameters will allow
us to determine also the level of the density which is simply the average household income.
5the latter is formed by all other formal sectors and the informal sector in ur-
ban areas.6 To clarify, we de¯ne two earning sectors: manufacturing earner
and other urban earner, the ¯rst of them belonging to the tradable sector
and, additionally a self-employed sector|capturing basically informality|
is de¯ned as part of the non-tradables. Furthermore, we assume separate
labour market equilibriums for men and women.
Equation (2) accounts for all possible income sources, therefore by parame-
terizing each its elements we can have a better understanding of the micro-
economic processes behind changes in overall distribution. The remaining of
this section describes the methodology that we will follow to estimate each




i=1 wih ¢ Lih in (2) measures total household earnings. wih are
hourly wages and Lih is a labour supply function, conditioned on member
i being a wage earner: Lih > 0. A separate wage function is estimated
for each of the 4 labour market segments that have been de¯ned.7 Following
standard human capital literature, wages' reduced form equation is a function
of personal characteristics in the following way:
wis = Xis¯s + "is s = (tradeable; non ¡ tradeable) (3)
Where X is a vector of (1 £ K) dimension and ¯ is a (K £ 1) vector 8 s;
K being the di®erent personal characteristics determining wages (including
a constant) and i = 1:::N number of workers in a particular sector. We
allow the residuals to have an expected value di®erent from zero: E["is] =
F(zi°s) where F(zi°s) is a generally de¯ned function capturing individual's
6Between 1994 and 2000 manufacturing exports accounted for 95% of total exports.
7Manufacturer earner and other earner for men and women.
6i probability of choosing sector s. We will come back to this point in section
2.3
2.2 Self-employed incomes
The next step is to model self-employment labour incomes, yih ¢ Lse
ih, where
yih is also measured in hourly units. In less developed countries, the labour
markets for self-employed workers is very much related with informality. In-
formal markets tend to be incomplete ones and therefore not showing desired
equilibrium conditions (i.e. marginal productivity equals real wage). To es-
timate labour remunerations in this sector we need separability properties
and a dataset rich enough to identify the marginal productivity of all factors
of production involved in the generation of yh. Data containing informa-
tion on the returns to each factor of production involved in self-employment
activities is rarely available.
Suppose that the self-employed sector has a labour market close to a compet-
itive one so that labour productivity can be taken as a shadow wage highly
correlated with real wages. In such a scenario, returns to X can be said to be
exclusive of all other factors of production, furthermore, self-employment ac-
tivities in the informal sector do not use capital nor land in an intensive way.
A formal sector that is semi-competitive and labour-intensive seem to be
reasonable assumptions in the case of Mexico. The self-employment market
in Mexico is basically formed of independent labourers in the informal sector
with few or no capital at all. Studies by Marcouiller, Ruiz and Woodru®
(1997) and Maloney (1999) show that the informal sector in urban Mexico
is as complete as the formal one representing a desired destination rather
than an inferior forced option. Therefore it is possible to identify returns to
personal characteristics using the same functional form as the one used for
hourly wages:
7yi = Xi¯se + Ài (4)
As in equation 3, Xi is a (1 £ K) vector and ¯se is (K £ 1) a vector. The
expected value of the residuals E[À] are also equal to a function F(zi°se) cap-
turing participation and occupation selection. We now turn to the estimation
of the labour supply components of (2).
2.3 Labour supply
The only elements missing from (2) are the labour supply functions in the
earnings and self-employment sectors Lih and L
y
ih.8 Estimation of these el-
ements involves modelling a discrete choice equation for participation, to-
gether with a continuous one for hours of work. However the data for Mexico
shows that, due to institutional rigidities, the distribution of hours worked
is highly concentrated around one single point (i.e. 42 hrs.) Therefore we
focus in the discrete choice part of the labour supply function, i.e. whether
to participate or not and in which sector agents decide to `sell' their labour
endowment.9
Assume that participation and occupation decisions of the population within
working age are the outcome of a `utility' maximizing processes involving
a set of pair comparisons between expected market wages and a subjective
valuation of leisure.10 De¯ne the indirect `utility' that individual i gets from
choosing option j:
8This section borrows heavily from De Hoyos (2005b).
9As stated by Heckman: `Participation (or employment) decisions generally manifest
greater responsiveness to wage and income variation than do hours-of-work equations for
workers' (Heckman, 1993, pg. 117).
10The utility interpretation of equation 5 is not necessary for it to be valid. We could
de¯ne Vij as a latent function de¯ning the probability of participation without any struc-
tural interpretation. Moreover the term `utility' should be taken with caution here since,
most likely, demand-side restrictions are present making the observed labour outcome the
result of factors beyond an individual's utility maximizing process.
8Vij = ± ^ wij + Zi°j + ´ij (5)
Where ^ wij are expected wages or self-employed income|following (3) and
(4) respectively; Zi are household characteristics of individual i.
Expected log wages, ^ wij are determined by the population estimate of X ^ ¯j.
We are implicity assuming that workers form wage expectations based on
their personal observable characteristics (X) and their respective market
value (¯) without accounting for the selectivity `premium' associated with
their participation/occupation decision (F(zi°j)). This is a necessary as-
sumption to identify all the parameters of the model. Individual's i par-
ticipation and occupation decisions will follow a utility maximizing criteria:
Vij > maxm6=jfVimg 8 j. If unobserved utility components ´ij, follow a logis-
tic CDF then the probability of observing agent i choosing occupation s is
de¯ned in the following way:
Prob(i = s) =
exp(± ^ wij + Zi°s)
PJ
j=1 exp(± ^ wij + Zi°j)
(6)
Expression (6) has two components, one of them are the expected wages,
which vary across outcomes and individuals and are treated as `attributes'
of the occupations. On the other hand Zi varies across individuals and it is
constant across outcomes, i.e. they characteristics attached to the individual.
Vector Zi for men include: household size, other household members' income
and its squared form. For women Zi includes: the number of children in the
household, a dummy variable taking the value of one when the head of the
household is male and is actively participating in the labour market, other
household members' income and its squared form and the variance of all
other household members' income.
Agents can choose among the following choices: earner in the manufacturing
(tradeable) sector, earner in other formal sectors, self-employed or being
9inactive.11 Equation 6 is a multinomial logit where agent i decides where to
sell her labour endowment (or not to sell it at all) based on her expected
wages in the di®erent occupations ^ wij and a set of household characteristics
Zi. De¯ning participation and occupation decisions as a function of ^ wij
allows us to measure the second-order e®ects of a policy-induced change in
expected wages.
This last feature makes our model di®erent from the one developed in Bour-
guignon, Fournier and Gurgand (2001), additionally our model is consistent
between the way it estimates participation and occupation decisions and the
way it controls for selectivity in the wage equations. Since labourers observed
in each sector are not the outcome of a random process (indeed they are fol-
lowing a utility maximizing criteria), we have to control for selectivity whilst
estimating the wage equations' parameters (¯). To be consistent between the
participation/occupation estimation and the selectivity-adjusted wage func-
tions, following Lee (1983), we correct for selectivity using the conditional
probabilities of a multinomial logit. Given the selectivity problem on the
one hand and the explicit relationship between expected wages and partici-
pation/occupation decisions on the other, the model just outlined involves the
simultaneous solution of equations (3) to (6). In this paper we will estimate
the model using a computationally simpler two-step procedure as the one de-
veloped and discussed in De Hoyos (2005b). De¯ne zi as a vector containing
Xi and Zi. We estimate selectivity-adjusted wages using the multinomial
logit conditional probabilities Pr(zi°j¤) = exp(zi°j¤)=
P
j exp(zi°j) in the
following way:






Where ¾j¤½j¤ are the parameters capturing selectivity; J(zi°j¤) is a transfor-
11Notice that the agents do not have the choice of having two occupations, we impose
this restriction to simplify the analysis. In Mexico, the primary source of income of all
household members accounts for as much as 90 per cent of total household income.
10mation of the multinomial logit index, zi°j¤, into a standard normal distrib-
ution and Á is the standard normal density function. Therefore the generally






use of vector Xi in the ¯rst-stage multinomial logit proxies for expected
wages and therefore the second step wage regressions give us the population
unbiased estimators of ¯j.
2.4 Microsimulation principles
So far we have shown how to parameterize household incomes in order to
identify the elements determining the level and shape of the density function.
The estimated parameters of equations (3) to (6) can be used to perform
microsimulation analysis to try to isolate the welfare e®ect of the policy
under evaluation.
Let us de¯ne ­t as a vector containing all the estimated parameters of equa-
tions (3) to (6) for time t. Similarly, de¯ne X
¤
t as a vector which elements
are all the independent variables in the model at time t. Finally a vector
of unobservables, ºt, encloses the set of residuals of all the estimated equa-
tions in the model. Therefore, household incomes Y t will be a function of
these three elements (and the exogenous income y0
h which for the moment we
exclude from the discussion); substituting the elements of Y t into (1), any





Hence a change in I can be decomposed into changes in the di®erent elements
of (8). Once all the elements of (8) are in place, we can create counterfactual
experiments of nature: what would the distribution look like had the elements
of, say, ­t been the only changed occurring between t and t0? For exam-
ple, let us say that returns to education in the manufacturing sector, b ¯m;t,
11changed due to trade liberalization and we will like to know the welfare (dis-
tribution/poverty) impact of such a change. We can compute a hypothetical










t contains the `imputed' value of ^ ¯mt. I{
t is a simulated, unobserved,
income inequality index where the income of each household in the database
is allowed to change as a result of the change in b ¯m;t and all other elements
are kept ¯xed. We will call this a ¯rst-order income e®ect. This type of
counterfactual exercise is quite powerful, since it enables us to identify not
only the qualitative but also the quantitative welfare e®ect of a change in
every element de¯ning the parameterized income equation (8): parameters,
covariates and residuals.
Another advantage of our model is its ability to quantify the second-order
income e®ects of changes in expected wages. Let us continue with our exam-
ple of an exogenous increase in b ¯m;t. This shift will have a direct ¯rst-order
e®ect upon household income via the increase in wages of household members
working in the manufacturing sector. However an increase in expected wages
in the manufacturing sector will also increase the likelihood of observing
workers with particular personal and household characteristics selling their
labour endowments in that sector. This second order e®ect is captured by the
structural labour participation/occupation function (6).12 In order to make a
clear distinction between the ¯rst and second order e®ects, let us de¯ne ­w;t
as a vector containing the parameters of equations (3) and (4); de¯ne ­L;t as
a vector which elements are the parameters of the participation/occupation
equations (6). Therefore ­t = (­w;t;­L;t). Changes in ­w;t will have a
12There are obvious demand-side constraints which are not being taken into account
by equation (6). We will address this important issue when we measure the second order
income e®ects of changes in ^ ¯ in section 5.2.
12second-order e®ect upon participation and/or occupation decisions, never-
theless changes in ­L;t will change labour participation/occupation|and
hence household income|without a®ecting market wages.13
We use the outlined microsimulation principles to answer the following ques-
tion: What is the ceteris paribus welfare e®ect of the observed change in
returns to personal characteristics taking place in the tradeable sector (­
T
w;t)
after the enactment of NAFTA? This simulation will capture the welfare
e®ects|via the labour market|of trade-induced macroeconomic changes
taking place between 1994 and 2000.14
As pointed out in Winters (2000), any macroeconomic exogenous shock (e.g.
trade policy) will have an e®ect upon the relative prices of the economy. In
our model, the single most important set of `prices' are the wages in the
di®erent segments of the labour market. Wages, in turn, are de¯ned as an
index of market `prices' of personal characteristics (­w;t). Therefore, in the
short run, changes in ­w;t re°ect, mainly, the macro-induced shifts in labour
demand. Following this argument, the di®erence between the observed house-
hold income density in a particular year and the simulated one capturing the
changes in ­w;t, is the welfare e®ects of macro-induced changes in labour
demand. By the same token, the simulated density capturing the welfare
e®ects of changes in `prices' in the tradable sector (­
T
w;t), captures the iso-
lated impact of shifts in labour demand in the tradable sector. In particular,
the changes in `prices' in the tradable sector taking place in Mexico between
1994 and 2000 can be attributable to the massive increase in manufacturing
exports following NAFTA and the peso devaluation. Our aim is to evaluate
the inequality and poverty impact of this change.
13In a general equilibrium setting, changes in labour supply function parameters should
have an e®ect upon market wages, however we consider that the model outlined here is
complex enough to capture ¯rst and second order e®ects of parametric changes in house-
hold income sources.
14In a recent literature review revising the trade and poverty linkages by Hertel and
Reimer (2004), the authors ¯nd that the strongest e®ect of trade upon poverty works via
the labour market and to a lesser extend through consumption e®ects.
13The methodology outlined here shows a way of departing from a macro
indicator (say income densities) and decomposed it into its micro compo-
nents. Once this is done|via microeconometrics|we can `go back' and
reconstruct the macro indicator this time with the micro parameters being
identi¯ed. This allows us to understand better the micro dynamics behind
macro changes.
3 The Mexican economy during the 1990s
In this section we brie°y outline the major changes occurring in the Mexican
economy during the second half of the 1990s, a period characterized by a
huge devaluation of the Mexican peso in 1994 and the subsequent increase
in exports within NAFTA.
During the early 1990s core reform of trade policy focused on the approval of a
regional trade agreement with the US and Canada where tari® reduction were
scheduled. The agreement, NAFTA, was signed in late 1993 and enacted 1st
of January 1994. The following 6 years after the enactment, real exports grew
an average rate of 17 per cent with the manufacturing maquiladora sector
setting the pace at a growing rate of 21 per cent during the period. Given the
timing of the two events, i.e. the enactment of NAFTA and the increase in
the exporting sector, it is tempting to conclude that the increase in exports
was the result of trade policy. However many other macroeconomic changes
took place, specially during 1994, year when NAFTA took e®ect.
Throughout 1994 Mexico experienced substantial political unrest that caused
a massive out°ow of portfolio investment. Capital out°ow combined with
a pegged exchange rate created a balance of payment crises. The crises
prompted investors to abandon the Mexican market and in December 1994
the peso su®er a devaluation of 83 per cent (see Figure 2). During 1995 real
GDP contracted 8 per cent and in°ation soared to 43 per cent. Through out
the 1996-2000 period the economy experienced an average rate of growth of
146 per cent per year lead, mainly, by exports of manufacturing products. The
boost in the exporting sector can be party explained by NAFTA and partly
by the large devaluation of the Mexican peso. As it is clear from Figure 2,
the performance of openness has been, not surprisingly, closely related with
the exchange rate.
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Data source: World Bank and Banco de Mexico
All these macroeconomic changes had a profound welfare e®ect as it is shown
in table 1. 15 Surprisingly, income distribution in 1996 lorenz-dominates the
distribution for 1994, i.e. for any inequality index, income was better dis-
tributed after the crisis.16 However, the negative growth e®ect of the 1994-95
crises was so large that the poverty headcount ratio increased in more than
10 percentage points. During the recovery period 1996-2000, poverty indica-
tors almost returned to its pre-crises level despite the increase in inequality
observed during those years.
15For a detailed description of the Mexican household data used in this paper (ENIGH)
and the way in which inequality and poverty indexes were constructed see De Hoyos
(2005a)
16Lopez-Acevedo and Salinas (1999) documented the possible causes behind the reduc-
tion in inequality during the 1995 economic crisis.
15Table 1: Income Inequality and Poverty Indexes
1994 1996 1998 2000
Inequality
Gini 0.534 0.516 0.527 0.528
Theil 0.568 0.537 0.559 0.548
Entropy("=¡1) 0.751 0.697 0.796 0.782
Poverty Headcount
Malnutrition 0.174 0.276 0.263 0.200
Capabilities 0.245 0.354 0.329 0.261
Assets 0.482 0.606 0.569 0.494
Source:
(1) Own estimations with data from ENIGH
(2) Poverty lines de¯ned by the Mexican Ministry of Social Development
3.1 Labour markets
The huge increase in total trade seen in the post-NAFTA years had a strong
e®ect upon the Mexican labour markets. To summarize its main e®ects, in
Figure 3 we show the annual percentage change of real wages and partici-
pation in the di®erent segments of the labour market. As predicted by the
theory, women's labour participation reaction to exogenous changes in the
economy was much stronger than that for men (see Deaton and Muellbauer
1980.) We can see from the upper part of Figure 3, that during the crisis
years (1994-96) male and female participation in the tradable sector increased
7.5 per cent and 20 per cent respectively. In the case of men, this increase
contrasts with the observed reduction in participation in the non-tradable
sectors; for women, participation also increased in the informal but not in
formal non-tradable sectors. Positive changes in participation rates in the
16tradable sectors are observed through out the period with the exception of
the period between 1996 and 1998, when participation in formal non-tradable
sectors recovered.
In the lower part of Figure 3 we show the time trends of real 2002 hourly
wages. The most important thing to notice is the di®erent pace at which
wages for men in the tradable sector recovered from the 1994-95 negative in-
come shock compared with the pace followed by wages in other non-tradable
sectors. In the case of women, hourly real wages in the tradeable sector are
performing as wages in the rest of the economy, however real earnings (i.e.
hourly wages multiplied by hours worked) in the tradable sector recovered
faster in the tradable sector than in the non-tradable one. The di®erence is
explained by an increase in average weekly hours worked by women in the
tradable sector. Average weekly hours worked by women in the tradable
sector passed from 43.95 in 1994, to 45.33 in 1996, and 45.87 in 1998. This
evidence is suggesting that while trade shocks a®ected real hourly wages for
men, the e®ect upon the female labour market had more to do with changes
in labour supply (participation as well as hours worked).







































































































































Women’s Real Hourly Wages
Bearing all these macro changes in mind, and being aware of the di±culty
of quantifying their isolated e®ect, in this paper we attempt to understand
the linkages between openness|in the form of an increase in manufacturing
trade volumes|and household incomes. In other words, we want to ¯nd
out the isolated welfare (inequality and poverty) impact of the documented
sectoral redistribution favouring the tradeable sector. Although it is im-
portant to distinguish between what is the e®ect of trade policy (NAFTA)
from all other macroeconomic changes a®ecting the tradable sector perfor-
mance (in particular the currency devaluation), the documented increase in
openness and its possible impact upon income inequality and poverty rep-
resents a challenging enough task.17 Moreover, so long as trade policy (e.g.
17In a recent paper Nicita (2004) tries to isolate the welfare e®ect of trade liberalizing
18a reduction in tari®s) is related with higher trade volumes, the qualitative
relationship between trade policy and household welfare can be discern from
our results.
4 Estimation results
In this section we present the estimation results of the model outlined in
Section 2. As we already mentioned, the model is estimated using Mexican
household data (ENIGH) for years 1994, 1996, 1998 and 2000. All the sta-
tistical analysis undertaken in this paper takes into account ENIGH's survey
design (strati¯cation, clustering and expansion factors).18 Given the great
amount of results, instead of describing them in a conventional way, we con-
centrate in the time patterns shown by our estimated wage and participation
equations parameters leaving the detailed results for an Appendix.19
In Figure 4 we show the annual change in the di®erent sector's expected log
wages for men and women. Expected wages are capturing the selectivity-
adjusted remuneration to personal characteristics in the di®erent sectors
(X ^ ¯). Since ^ wij are free of selection bias, they are valid for the female and
male population, respectively; i.e. ^ wij is the wage that individual i would
earn if she decided to sell her labour endowment in sector j regardless of her
present labour status and occupation. Notice that the di®erence between
average observed hourly log wages (¯gure 3) and the average expected ones
reforms using household data combined with price changes in certain commodities. In a
forthcoming paper we combine the microsimulation model outlined here with an explicit
trade-price-wages econometric estimation to quantify the isolated impact of tari® reduction
as a result of NAFTA. Preliminary results show that, in the case of Mexico, tari® reduction
under NAFTA is far from being the main determinant of the changes occurring in the
tradable sector after 1994.
18See De Hoyos (2005a) for details.
19The results of equations 3 to 6 are shown in Appendix A, however due to space
limitation we do not show the estimates of the multinomial logit ¯rst-stage estimations,
these are available from the author upon request.
19(Figure 4) is attributable to the selection component of the wage equation:
F(zi°s).
In general, apart from the changes occurring in the informal sector, we can
say that the market value of personal characteristics did not decrease (it
even increased in the manufacturing sector) as much as real wages after the
1994-95 negative shock. This evidence suggests that during a negative in-
come shock the better a worker is endowed with X, the lower the impact of
the shock. In the case of post NAFTA Mexico, this is particularly true for
workers in the tradable (manufacturing) sector. The market value of male
personal characteristics in the manufacturing sector were 2.5 times higher
after the 1994-95 crisis. This is a quite powerful result specially if we con-
sider that expected wages in the non-tradable sectors experienced a negative
shock. Tradable's positive impact is not as sharp in the female labour mar-
ket, however average ^ wi still shows a performance well above the average one
where ^ wi remained constant between 1994 and 1996 when the change in other
non-tradable sectors was negative. Between 1996 and 1998, expected wages
for men in the tradable sector did not change whilst those for women showed
an increase of 20 per cent. Between 1998 and 2000, once the e®ect of the
1994-95 crisis were fading away, expected wages in the tradeable and informal
sectors decreased, especially those of men in the tradable sector.

































































Source: Own estimations with data from ENIGH
Women
20The results presented in Appendix A.1 permit a closer inspection of the
sources behind the opposing changes in average ^ wij between tradable and
non-tradable sectors. From Table 1 in Appendix A.1 we can see that the
sharp increase in men's expected wages in the tradable sector is explain by
a shift in the equation's intercept and to a lesser extend to an increase in
the wage premium for higher education between 1994 and 1996. On the
other hand, the reduction in expected wages for men working in formal
non-tradable sectors is also explained by shifts in the intercepts. In both
labour segments (male and female) the returns associated with formal years
of schooling in the tradable sector decreased, however the premium for higher
education increased between 1994 and 1996. After 1996, changes in men's
expected wages are explained by the combination of shifts in the intercept
and increases in the wage premium for workers located in the north of Mex-
ico. Since the parameters estimated in all wage equations are free of selection
bias, we can interpret them as sector-speci¯c `treatment' e®ects. Therefore
an overall positive shift in the tradable sector wage function combined with
a negative change in the non-tradable sector, is evidence of a tradable sector-
speci¯c positive wage e®ect.
Regarding women's expected wages, our results show that the main factor
behind the post-1996 tradeable sector ^ wi outstanding performance is the in-
crease in the wage premium associated with female workers located in the
north of Mexico. Given that most of the post-NAFTA exporting manufac-
turing ¯rms are located in the north of Mexico, a positive wage premium
associated with workers in this region points towards a trade-induced posi-
tive e®ect upon real expected wages. This result as well as those ones found
in the male labour market, suggest a trade-speci¯c positive wage e®ect.
The changes in ^ wij documented in Figure 4 can have a signi¯cant e®ect upon
labour participation (L) and occupation among the di®erent sectors. Par-
ticipation/occupation decisions will change as a results of changes in ^ wij as
long as the estimated wage-participation elasticity is di®erent from zero. In
21Appendix A.2 we show the estimation results for equation 6.20 The para-
meter capturing the wage-participation elasticity is positive and signi¯cantly
di®erent from zero in all years both for men and women. Following the
marginal e®ect formulae for the multinomial logit, the wage-participation
elasticity can be easily computed based on the estimated wage-participation
parameter. The results are shown in Figure 5. We can see that apart from
1996 (a year when there was a large negative income shock) the percent-
age increases in female participation as a result of an increase in expected
wages tend to be larger than that for men. A 1 per cent increase in expected
wages will increase female labour participation rate 0.35 per cent on average,
whereas male increase in participation as a result of the same change would
be around 0.25 per cent (excluding year 1996). These results help us explain
the changes in labour supply documented in Section 3.1. Since female wage-
participation elasticity is larger than that for males, changes in female labour
demand will have a larger impact upon employment (participation and hours
worked) than in real hourly wages.
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Men’s Elasticity Women’s Elasticity
Source: Own estimations with data from ENIGH
20A detailed discussion on the participation/occupation equation results for women can
be found in De Hoyos (2005b)
22To summarize, we have shown that contrary to what one would expect, ^ wi in
the tradable sector did not decrease during the crisis years of 1994-96. On the
other hand, ^ wi in non-tradable sectors show the expected 1994-96 negative
shock and the post 1996 recovery (for the formal non-tradable sectors). The
di®erence in ^ wi between these two sectors, most likely, can be attributable
to trade e®ects. The estimated wage-participation elasticity is positive and,
a part from 1996, larger for women than for men.
4.1 Interpretation and robustness
Based on our empirical results we have made an argument supporting the
hypothesis that most of the post-1994 sectoral redistribution is actually cap-
turing the e®ects of trade. The positive and temporary `treatment' e®ect
upon the tradable sector can be attributable to two main factors: trade pol-
icy (NAFTA) and the peso devaluation of 1995. A sensible criticism to these
results is that they are, to some extents, driven by changes in one single
parameter in the wage equation, namely, the intercept which can be simply
capturing noise in the data or be dependent upon the econometric speci¯ca-
tion. In this section we will elaborate on these important points.
From Table 1 in Appendix A.1 we can see that, as a matter of fact, many
of the intercepts of the wage equations in the manufacturing sector are not
statistically di®erent from zero. Therefore our main result (increases in trad-
able's sector ^ wi) might be simply capturing noise rather than a legitimum
change in labour market conditions. However, more important that their
absolute value, what determines the presence of a trade-induced e®ect are
the changes in the value of the parameters in the tradable sector relative to
the changes in the non-tradable sector. Between 1994 and 1996 the change
in intercept in the formal non-tradable sectors was negative (the di®erence in
intercepts is statistically di®erent from zero at the 99 per cent level) while the
change in the intercept for the manufacturing sector is positive and signi¯-
23cant at the 90 per cent level of con¯dence.21 Hence, ceteris paribus, workers
in the non-tradable sector will experience an exogenous increase in the wage
they expect to earn if they decide to move to the tradable sector regardless of
their endowment X. The other important variable driving our results is the
change in the dummy variable measuring wage di®erentials between labour-
ers in the tradable sectors located in the north of Mexico compared with
non-tradable sectors and other regions. The di®erence in this parameters,
both for male and female, between 1996 and 1998, are statistically di®erent
from zero. All these results support the hypothesis of a trade-induced posi-
tive shift in labour demand during a period of a large devaluation combined
with a wider exporting window opened by NAFTA.
A temporary positive shock on returns to personal characteristics in the trad-
able sector is a result also found in a recent paper by Verhoogen (2004). Using
¯rm-level data, the author develops and tests a model where south to north
exporting products enjoy a higher quality than those ones produced for the
domestic market. After an exchange rate shock, the demand for high quality
products increases (exports) therefore southern exporting ¯rms increase their
labour demand, particularly the one for skilled workers. These changes in
relative demand, causes an increase in the skilled-unskilled wage-ratio. Af-
ter the exchange rate shock vanishes, domestic market production recovers
and demand for skills is reduced, hence returns to personal characteristics
and the wage ratio returns to its pre-crisis level. This pattern in returns to
personal characteristics is supported by our results using household survey
data.
A second point that might give rise to criticism about our results is how de-
pendent they are to di®erent methods to control for selectivity. To address
this concern, using the conditional probabilities of participation estimated
21Given the negative change in the non-tradable wage equation intercept, even a con-
stant intercept in the tradable sector wage equation will be enough to conclude that the
performance of ^ wi in the tradable sector was relatively better than the non-tradable sector
one.
24from the multinomial logit, we control for selectivity using two alternative
methodologies described in Durbin and McFadden (1984) and Bourguignon,
Fournier and Gurgand (2004). Using whichever of these two selectivity-
adjustment methods do not alter the general results discussed in the previ-
ous section, though the magnitude of the changes in parameters varies quite
a lot across these methods. Both approaches suggest that there is a man-
ufacturing sector `treatment' e®ect shifting the wage equation parameters
in favour of the tradable sector after the combination of NAFTA and the
peso devaluation, particularly between years 1996 and 1998. However the
estimated parameters, specially the intercept, are very volatile under these
two alternative methods. Finally, we carried out a fourth experiment where
selection bias was controlled µ a la Heckman (1979) using a probit model in
the ¯rst-stage estimation; the trade versus non-trade divergence in ^ wi was
still present with the estimated parameters being much more stable.
A further concern about the interpretation of our results could lie in the
e®ects captured by changes in returns to personal characteristics (^ ¯) in the
tradable sector. Although this paper focuses on the welfare impact of in-
creases in trade volumes (regardless of what triggers it) the results will not
be very useful for trade policy implications if we are only capturing the e®ects
of the devaluation. To make a case against this extreme interpretation, we
compare the performance of trade after the 1994-95 peso crisis and NAFTA
with an episode with a large currency crisis in the absence of a trade agree-
ment. The period between years 1982 and 1983 represent a scenario with
devaluation but without a trade agreement. Between 1982 and 1983 the
Mexican peso su®ered a devaluation of 100 per cent, however at that time
the Mexican economy was a relatively closed one with average tari®s above
25 per cent and with 90 per cent of the tradable products subject to trade
licensing. Openness (measured as the total trade °ows as a percentage of
GDP) increased only 2 percentage points between 1982 and 1983 (see Figure
2) as opposed to the 20 per cent increase in openness observed after a deval-
uation of 80 per cent in 1994. Therefore we can say that the post-1994 boom
25in export volumes is explained by the devaluation of the Mexican peso in the
presence of a trade agreement. In the remainder of the paper, we will inter-
pret the changes in ^ ¯ in the manufacturing sector as being the outcome of
increasing trade volumes, which were triggered, in turn, by the combination
of trade policy and the peso devaluation.
A ¯nal caveat must be stated. The rest of the paper tries to quantify the
welfare e®ects of the changes in ^ wij just documented. As in any other econo-
metric analysis, robustness in the quantitative aspect of the parameters is
hardly achieved. Although we showed that the qualitative changes in ^ wij
are robust to several selectivity-correction methods, we cannot say the same
for the value of the parameters. Therefore the results that we present in
the subsequent sections have to be taken only as ¯rst approximations to the
quantitative welfare e®ects of trade-induced changes in ^ wij.
5 Microsimulation analysis
The changes in ^ wij documented so far (Figure 4) are not entirely explained
by changes in parameters, ­w, they also capture changes in endowments, X,
and their distribution. To be able to quantify the isolated welfare impact of
trade-induced changes in wage equation parameters, ­T
w, in this section we
will undertake a microsimulation analysis like the one described in Section
2.4.
To capture the micro dynamics of changes in manufacturing sector `prices'
of personal characteristics, we undertake three separate simulations. Taking
1994 as our base year we `import' the estimated tradable sector's wage equa-
tion parameters ­T
w for years 1996, 1998, and 2000. Each of these simulations
can be interpreted as the ceteris paribus income e®ect of ¢­T
w between 1994
and t0. Once ­T
w had been `imported' and a new set of simulated wages had
been computed, we will follow the methodology outlined in Section 2.4 to
compute a set of simulated household incomes. Each of these simulations
26is answering the question: how would household incomes in 1994 have look
like had the returns to personal characteristics in the tradable sector been the
same as the ones observed in t0?22
5.1 First-order welfare e®ect
Given the great di®erences shown by ^ wij between the pre- and post-crises
periods, we separate the discussion of our simulations into those covering the
years 1994-1996 and 1996-2000. In Figure 6 we show the log of per capita
household income densities of two di®erent simulations using 1994 as the base
year and `importing' the estimated parameters for year 1996. In the simu-
lation called `simulating trade', we import only the estimated parameters in
the tradable sector for year 1996 keeping non-tradeable parameters and all
sector covariates and unobservables ¯xed. In a second simulation we import
only the estimated parameters for the non-tradable sector leaving those in the
tradable sector ¯xed. `Simulating trade' is creating a hypothetical scenario
where all the post-NAFTA/devaluation bene¯ts of trade are occurring with-
out the costs impinged upon the non-tradable sectors. This counterfactual
can be interpreted as a hypothetical economy with all the bene¯ts of trade
expansion without the costs of the devaluation. `Simulating no-trade' creates
a hypothetical economy where the crisis negative shock taking place in the
non-tradable (captured by the shifts in ^ ¯) is occurring without the bene¯ts
experienced by the tradable sector (­T
w remains constant). We can think of
this second counterfactual as simulating what would the income density had
been if the peso crisis had occurred in the absence of NAFTA.
As we can see from Figure 6, everything else being equal, the changes in
returns to personal characteristics in the tradable sector had a positive e®ect
upon household per capita incomes regardless of their position in the dis-
tribution (positive growth e®ect). However since the average worker in the
22Conversely, the same simulation can be interpreted as creating a counterfactual house-
hold income for year t0 where everything but ­T
w remained constant.
27manufacturing sector tends to be located at the middle part of the density,
trade's positive e®ect was quite moderate in the lower income cohorts (nega-
tive redistribution e®ect). This biased e®ect is re°ected in the low pro-poor
impact of changes in the tradable sector's wage parameters.
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(1) Gaussian kernel density (2) Urban poverty line set at 673 monthly Pesos
In Table 2 we show the observed and simulated urban poverty and inequality
indexes for the years 1994 to 2000. For year 1994 there is no simulated values
since we always take this year as the base one importing the parameters of
subsequent years. We show the results of the two simulations, i.e. a scenario
with and without tradable's sector changes in ­ T
w. Had the only change in
the economy between 1994 and 1996 been the returns to personal character-
istics in the tradable sector, poverty would have been reduced from an initial
headcount ratio of 7.3 per cent to a ¯nal one of 6.2 per cent. Conversely,
if the only change allowed was the one experienced by the wage parameters
in the non-tradable sectors (simulating crisis without trade), then poverty
would have increased from 7.3 per cent in 1994 to 20.7 per cent in 1996, with
a poverty headcount ratio 2 percentage points above the observed level. In
other words, had NAFTA not been enacted, we would have observed an even
larger increase in poverty after the peso crisis of 1994-95. The actual change
28in poverty between those years was indeed between the simulated trade and
no-trade e®ects. Regarding redistribution, changes in parameters|both in
the tradable and non-tradable sectors|had an adverse redistribution e®ect.
However, the increase in inequality when simulating trade e®ects is much
larger (an increase of 14 Gini points) than the one simulating the no-trade
e®ects (three Gini points). This is totally explained by the reduction in the
mass around the mean together with an increase of the upper tail in the den-
sity capturing the e®ects of trade (¯gure 6). Hence the increase in inequality
is not explained by reductions in the income of the poor but by increases in
incomes of upper cohorts.23
Table 2: Simulated Income Inequality and Poverty Indexes (Urban Areas)
1994 1996 1998 2000
Observed
Poverty 0.073 0.183 0.142 0.092
Gini 0.493 0.483 0.484 0.473
Simulating trade
Poverty - 0.062 0.060 0.100
Gini - 0.635 0.621 0.501
Simulating no-trade
Poverty - 0.207 0.131 0.170
Gini - 0.522 0.497 0.511
Source and notes:
(1) Own estimations with data from ENIGH
(2) The poverty index is the headcount ratio
(3) Using the urban poverty line de¯ned by the Mexican Ministry of
Social Development
23The increase in inequality is allowing for post-simulation re-ranking of individuals
along the income density.
29After 1996, the simulated poverty bene¯ts of trade volumes tend to decrease.
By 2000 the simulated isolated poverty e®ect of trade is adverse compared
with the observed value for that same year. These results are driven by the
temporary increase in tradable sector's ^ wi discussed in Section 4. Once ^ wi in
the tradable sector returns to its pre-crises level (in year 2000), the positive
trade e®ects tend to vanish. This is particularly the case for the male labour
market. Nevertheless, the simulated welfare e®ects in the presence of trade
are still preferable to those ones in the absence of it. In Figure 7 we show the
results for the same type of simulation as in Figure 6 this time using the wage
parameters for year 2000. Had trade liberalization not taken place (and hence
the parameters of the wage equation in the tradable sector didn't change),
the poverty headcount ratio would have been 17 per cent compared with an
index of 10 per cent simulated under the trade liberalization scenario.
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(1) Gaussian kernel density (2) Urban poverty line set at 673 monthly Pesos
In this section we have shown the welfare impact of the asymmetric changes
in ^ wij discussed in Section 4. As one would have expected a ceteris paribus
increase in tradable sector's ^ wi has a positive welfare e®ect, increasing average
income and reducing poverty. Given the position of tradable sector workers in
the urban income density, an increase in their remunerations has an adverse
30distributive impact. Our simulations also illustrated that had the peso crisis
occurred in the absence of NAFTA, the poverty headcount ratio would have
been 2 percentage points above the 1996 observed level. The positive welfare
e®ects occurring via changes in the tradable sector vanish by year 2000. This
last result suggests that although the devaluation of the Mexican peso was
ameliorated in the presence of a trade reform, NAFTA, by itself, does not
represent a long-term development policy.
5.2 Second-order welfare e®ect
So far we had discussed the changes in household income brought about
by changes in returns to personal characteristics without allowing agents to
re-optimize given the new set of `prices'. In this section we will explore
the second-order household income e®ects of changes in ­T
w. As we saw
in Section 4, the post-NAFTA/crises changes in ^ wij favoured the tradable
sector. If labour markets are not perfectly segmented we would expect labour
movements out of the non-tradable sector into the tradable one. Additionally,
overall labour participation could have increased after the macro shock.
To account for the changes in participation and occupation decisions given
the simulated set of ^ wij we use the wage-participation elasticity results pre-
sented in Section 4. Substituting the simulated expected wages into equation
(6) we compute a new set of participation probabilities. As we already men-
tioned, an agent's `utility' maximizing decision (or the most probable out-
come) could be bounded by demand-side restrictions. To take this restriction
into account, we construct an excess labour supply by comparing the simu-
lated utility maximizing decisions with the observed outcomes for each sector
in each point in time. For example, simulating the ceteris paribus change in
participation/occupation as a result of changes in ^ wij between 1994 and 1996
we ¯nd out that, in the absence of demand-side restrictions, participation in
the tradable sector would have passed from 12 per cent to 26 per cent of
the total working age population. This simulated increase in tradable sector
31participation contrasts with the observed one which passed from 12 per cent
in 1994 to 14 per cent in 1996. If we allow all those workers `willing' to work
in the tradable sector (26 per cent of them with the 1996 parameters) to do
so, we will be ignoring labour demand restrictions and hence overestimating
trade's positive second-order e®ects. Instead of using unrestricted labour
movements, we constrain the excess labour supply (i.e. when even there is
a net increase in participation) to be no larger than the observed increase.
Following or example, when we simulate the second order e®ects of changes
in ­T
w between 1994 and 1996, workers are allowed to enter the tradable sec-
tor up to a point where 14 per cent of the total population within working
age is employed in that sector. We `select' the workers that enter into each
sector based on their `willingness' (probability) to do so, therefore workers
with higher utility (probability) of entering the sector with an excess labour
supply will enter ¯rst. On the other hand, a simulated negative excess labour
supply is not bounded by demand restrictions and therefore the full e®ect is
allowed to pass through.
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(1) Gaussian kernel density (2) Urban poverty line set at 673 monthly Pesos
The second-order income e®ect of changes in ­ T
w are shown in Figure 8. Fol-
lowing Section 5.1 we show two di®erent simulations, one of them using ­T
w
for 1996, and a second one with the estimated parameters for 2000. This time
we only compute the second order e®ects of changes in tradable sector para-
32meters ceteris paribus without showing the second order e®ects of changes in
non-tradable parameters. As we can see from Figure 8, the second-order in-
come e®ects are rather small (given labour demand constraints) though still
positive.24 The positive second-order e®ect is more evident when we use the
simulated wages with the estimated parameters for 2000; the mass around
the mean increases and this is compensated by a lower tail decrease.
Given the microeconomic nature of our methodology, we can have a closer
look at the distributive impact brought about by the change in an agent's op-
timizing decision. Useful information about the inequality impact caused by
a sectoral redistribution can be obtained by knowing the socioeconomic char-
acteristics of the agents working in the each sector. We would expect a wors-
ened distribution if most of the workers in the growing tradeable sector belong
to relatively better o® households. In Figure 9 we show non-parametric re-
gression lines with the number of workers in each centile in 1994 and for the
1996 and 2000 simulated second order e®ect (without re-ranking). We can
see that in 1994 the majority of the workers in the tradable sector belonged
to middle class households (between the 50th and 60th centile). In the case
of men, the 1996 simulated change in expected wages in the tradable sector
increased participation in all income cohorts (the simulation line is above the
observed one in all centiles) but this was particularly true for workers belong-
ing to upper income cohorts, i.e. workers enjoying higher skill endowments.
The labour composition in the case of women changed in a way that more
unskilled workers|belonging to lower income cohorts|entered the tradable
sector after the combination of NAFTA and the crisis. Hence, although the
second-order income e®ect of changes in tradable sector parameters was pos-
itive, it was disequalizing in the case of men and equalizing in the case of
24Following economic theory and the methodology used in this study, it is impossible to
have a negative second-order welfare e®ect. Given a new set of prices in the economy, the
agents will always be better o® if they are allowed to re-optimize their consumption and
labour allocation decisions. Regarding household income, the only way to have a negative
second order income e®ect is if there is a strong and negative substitution e®ect making
workers better o® by abandoning the labour market.
33women between 1994 and 1996. The story is completely di®erent for the
simulated changes using the parameters for 2000. The results presented in
the right hand side of Figure 9 con¯rm our previous ¯ndings: the second
order e®ect for 2000 had an equalizing income e®ect. Taking the estimated
parameters for 2000, the number of simulated workers whose households be-
longed to lower income cohorts increased, indeed the household of the typical
worker in the tradable sector was located around the 35th and 45th income
centile compared with the 50th to 60th centile observed in 1994.




























(1)Line fitted using local regressions (2) Data Source: ENIGH
Women
In this section we have shown how the micro model outlined in Section 2
can be used to uncover second-order household income e®ects of changes in
prices|in our case returns to personal characteristics. We showed that al-
though demand-constraint second-order e®ects tend to be small, the impact
is always positive. Our ¯ndings suggest that there are important distribu-
tional impacts emanating from the changes in participation and occupation.
In particular, the labour participation changes occurring as a consequence of
changes in returns to personal characteristics in the tradable sector, had an
adverse distributional impact between 1994 and 1996, increasing the relative
participation of skilled workers. By the year 2000 the e®ect was exactly the
opposite, with a change in in the skill-mix favouring unskilled labourers.
346 Conclusion
This paper is motivated by the growing concern on the microeconomic impact
of policy decisions taken at the macro level. We depart from the changes in
income densities which summarizes all welfare changes taking place between
two points in time. With the use of economic theory and microeconometric
techniques we decompose the changes in densities (and therefore any welfare
index) into changes in parameters, covariates and unobservables. Our model
contributes to the existing literature by creating an explicit relationship be-
tween expected wages and labour participation. This last feature allows us to
quantify the second-order welfare e®ects of policy-driven changes in expected
wages.
Our methodology is used to explore the welfare impact of the Mexican ex-
pansion in exports after the Peso devaluation and the enactment of NAFTA.
We found robust positive changes in the returns to personal characteristics
in the tradable sector between 1994 and 1998. Although expected wages in
the tradable sector increased for all workers regardless of their personal char-
acteristics (positive shift in the intercept), those workers with higher skills
and/or located in the North of Mexico, experienced an even larger positive
e®ect. The increase in higher education premium had as a consequence a
deterioration in household income distribution. Our results are robust to
several forms of selectivity-correction methods and they are supported by
the ¯ndings of recent post NAFTA ¯rm behaviour studies.
Using microsimulation techniques, we quantify the ceteris paribus welfare
e®ects of increases in trade volumes. In a hypothetical economy where de-
valuation is taking place in the absence of NAFTA, i.e. all the costs of the
devaluation upon the non-tradable sector are occurring while the bene¯ts
of an expanding tradeable sector are not, poverty would have increased 2
percentage points above the observed 1996 level. Nevertheless, the isolated
impact of a change in tradable sector's parameters had an adverse distributive
35impact increasing the Gini in 13 points. By year 2000 the positive tradable
sector `treatment' e®ect vanished, with returns to personal characteristics
converging to the levels observed in the non-tradable sectors.
The paper contributes to the growing microsimulation literature by quan-
tifying in an explicit way the second-order income e®ects brought about by
changes in expected wages. We estimate a wage-participation elasticity which
is then used to quantify the change in participation and occupation caused by
changes in expected wages in the di®erent sectors. After the peso/NAFTA
shock, relatively skilled male workers entered the tradable sector while the
oppositive happened in the female labour market where the tradable sector
was absorbing relatively unskilled labourers. These changes had an adverse
e®ect upon distribution, although the overall second-order income e®ect of
the isolated trade-induced changes in expected wages was positive.
Although NAFTA `cushioned' the adverse e®ects of the peso devaluation,
proving to be the right policy decision at that time, as soon as the peso re-
covered its value (between years 1998 and 2000) the growing pace of Mexican
manufacturing exports and the wage premium associated with it decreased.
Therefore the isolated positive welfare e®ects caused by trade expansion dis-
appear between 1998 and 2000. Our ¯ndings suggest that NAFTA, by itself
and given the present economic conditions in Mexico, does not represent a
long-term development policy. The episode 1994-98 showed the great bene¯ts
of having a trade agreement combined with a highly competitive industrial
sector. At that time, competitiveness came exogenously in the form of a
currency crisis, however long-term sustainable competitiveness should come
from an increase in productivity which is exactly what Mexican industrial
policy should aim for.
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40A Model Results
A.1 Selectivity-Adjusted Wages
Table 1: Wage Functions for the Tradable Sector
1994 1996 1998 2000
Men
Schooling 0.150*** 0.111*** 0.125*** 0.144***
Schooling ¤ I(Y s > 11) -0.019 0.035** 0.019** -0.026
Experience 0.075*** 0.079*** 0.076*** 0.077***
Experience2 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.002**
North 0.061 0.007 0.173** 0.588*
Pr(manufacture)y 1.129** -0.793 -0.693 1.76
Intercept -0.607 1.649 1.500* -1.508
R2 0.469 0.432 0.427 0.446
N 1271 1513 1107 968
Women
Schooling 0.138*** 0.105*** 0.149*** 0.111***
Schooling ¤ I(Y s > 11) -0.004 0.022 0.003 0
Experience 0.068*** 0.042*** 0.071*** 0.031***
Experience2 -0.001*** -0.001** -0.001*** 0
North 0.074 0.141 0.269*** 0.333***
Pr(manufacture)y 0.275 0.142 -0.076 0.105
Intercept 0.355 0.579* 0.295 0.801**
R2 0.271 0.248 0.28 0.237
N 491 609 511 428
Notes:
(1) *,**,***, signi¯cant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively
(2) Bootstrap standard errors with 200 replications
(3) Data source: ENIGH 1994, 1996, 1998 and 2000
(4) Pr(¢)y are computed following Lee (1983)
41Table 2: Wage Functions for Non-tradable Formal Sectors
1994 1996 1998 2000
Men
Schooling 0.109*** 0.109*** 0.097*** 0.088***
Schooling ¤ I(Y s > 11) 0.016** 0.021*** 0.024*** 0.021**
Experience 0.059*** 0.065*** 0.055*** 0.053***
Experience2 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***
North 0.055 0.083* 0.180*** 0.137*
Pr(other earner)y -0.611* 0.09 -0.432 -0.257
Intercept 1.568*** 0.663** 1.228*** 1.364***
R2 0.475 0.416 0.43 0.397
N 3838 4155 3293 2994
Women
Schooling 0.148*** 0.136*** 0.143*** 0.131***
Schooling ¤ I(Y s > 11) 0.020*** 0.014*** 0.021*** 0.011*
Experience 0.077*** 0.069*** 0.060*** 0.057***
Experience2 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***
North -0.046 0.004 0.083* 0.105**
Pr(other earner)y 0.290*** 0.245*** 0.243** 0.065
Intercept 0.337* 0.21 0.059 0.637***
R2 0.469 0.376 0.411 0.403
N 2213 2393 1950 1850
Notes:
(1) *,**,***, signi¯cant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively
(2) Bootstrap standard errors with 200 replications
(3) Data source: ENIGH 1994, 1996, 1998 and 2000
(4) Pr(¢)y are computed following Lee (1983)
42Table 3: Wage Functions for Non-tradable Informal Sector
1994 1996 1998 2000
Men
Schooling 0.036 0.069*** 0.061*** 0.089***
Schooling ¤ I(Y s > 11) 0.033*** 0.017 0.011 -0.011
Experience 0.046* 0.108*** 0.042* 0.080***
Experience2 -0.001* -0.002*** -0.001** -0.001**
North 0.068 0.063 0.082 0.006
Pr(informal)y 0.141 0.680* -0.354 0.897*
Intercept 1.783** -0.59 2.112** -0.556
R2 0.114 0.171 0.107 0.215
N 909 1061 788 651
Women
Schooling 0.081*** 0.064*** 0.052** 0.037
Schooling ¤ I(Y s > 11) 0.013 0.004 0.034 0.026
Experience 0.023 0.046*** 0.033 0.063**
Experience2 0 -0.001** 0 -0.001*
North -0.124 0.034 -0.076 -0.096
Pr(informal)y 0.062 0.364 0.143 0.701**
Intercept 1.368** 0.272 0.902 -0.23
R2 0.053 0.063 0.053 0.084
N 620 857 663 581
Notes:
(1) *,**,***, signi¯cant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively
(2) Bootstrap standard errors with 200 replications
(3) Data source: ENIGH 1994, 1996, 1998 and 2000
(4) Pr(¢)y are computed following Lee (1983)
43A.2 Participation and Occupation Functions
Table 4: Men's Participation and Occupation Functions
1994 1996 1998 2000
^ w 1.954*** 1.968*** 1.560*** 2.147***
~ h -0.243*** -0.151*** -0.237*** -0.221***
Tradable Earner
Intercept -2.913*** -6.357*** -3.618*** -2.626***
HH Size 0.141*** 0.092*** 0.091*** 0.201***
Y 0
m -11.585*** -19.372*** -15.188*** -14.272***
(Y 0
m)2 4.842*** 3.270*** 8.480** 10.310***
Non-tradable Earner
Intercept -0.738*** -1.188*** 0.493*** -1.736***
HH Size 0.070*** 0.032 0.047* 0.132***
Y 0
m -10.635*** -13.920*** -12.833*** -13.974***
(Y 0
m)2 4.744*** 2.379*** 7.947** 10.323***
Informal Sector
HH Size 0.033 0.062** 0.083*** 0.117***
Y 0
m -14.646*** -19.068*** -19.665*** -19.152***
(Y 0
m)2 6.104*** 3.227*** 9.473*** 12.823***
R2 0.202 0.205 0.179 0.212
N 33500 37496 28080 24592
*,**,***, signi¯cant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively (with bootstrapped SE)
44Table 5: Women's Participation and Occupation Functions
1994 1996 1998 2000
^ w 1.423*** 1.614*** 1.311*** 1.721***
~ h -0.168*** -0.126*** -0.127*** -0.115***
Tradable Earner
Intercept -1.796*** -2.688*** -2.913*** -3.819***
Children -0.267*** -0.049 -0.002 0.135
Ha
s -1.011*** -1.028*** -0.937*** -0.627***
Ha
d -0.024 0.15 0.319** 0.730***
Y 0
m -6.369*** -11.127*** -11.662*** -11.938***
(Y 0
m)2 1.137*** 1.727*** 6.106*** 7.133***
V ar(Y 0
m) 0.002** 0.001 0.001** -0.037
Non-tradable Earner
Intercept -1.002*** -1.305*** -0.640*** -2.524***
Children -0.037 -0.111*** 0.008 -0.063
Ha
s -1.017*** -1.038*** -0.894*** -0.815***
Ha
d 0.049 -0.351*** -0.021 0.047
Y 0
m -4.545*** -6.085*** -7.973*** -6.773***
(Y 0
m)2 0.807*** 0.916*** 5.294*** 3.175*
V ar(Y 0
m) 0.002*** 0.001 0.001*** 0.001
Informal Sector
Intercept - - - -
Children -0.049 -0.028 -0.028 0.053
Ha
s -0.495*** -0.546*** -0.500*** -0.389**
Ha
d -1.653*** -1.221*** -1.296*** -0.755***
Y 0
m -10.784*** -14.108*** -12.208*** -12.454***
(Y 0
m)2 1.950*** 2.261*** 6.206*** 5.063**
V ar(Y 0
m) 0.002** 0.001 0.002*** 0.002
R2 0.389 0.363 0.326 0.345
N 38932 43392 32836 29320
*,**,***, signi¯cant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively (with bootstrapped SE)
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